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DEMOCRATIC POLICING CONFRONTS TERROR
AND PROTEST
Jerome H. Skolnick"'
The idea of legal evolution to a rule of law necessarily implies
restraints upon the coercive power of the state. 1 Whatever we might
mean by coercive state power, surely the institution of the police
embodies the essence of such power. Democratic policing has long been
a guiding concern in studies of American policing; and it is a major goal
of nations in transition to democracy, especially those in Eastern
Europe. 2 By those seeking change, democratic policing must be
concerned with the rule of law as well as with crime and public orderand terrorism.
As police scholar Herman Goldstein argued in 1977, when crime
was menacing America's cities, "a concern for preserving and extending
democratic values [should] be made the ethos of professional police
work." He maintained this commitment, partly because it exemplifies
the differences between democratic and totalitarian policing, and,
foreshadowing his later work on "problem-oriented" policing, it is the
conduit to community respect and cooperation. 3 David Alan Sklansky
offers a rich, recent discussion of the nuances of the concept of
democracy and the implications for policing of differing interpretations
of democracy. 4 This article is intended neither as an exposition of
democratic theory nor the implications of Constitutional jurisprudence
for policing in general. Rather, in it I intend to illustrate, using the New
York City Police Department as an example, how a democratic police
department has responded to terrorist threats following two major
attacks to New York City's World Trade Center; and the stance it has
taken to policing anti-war protest since the United States invasion of
*Affiliated Professor, and co-Director, Center for Research in Crime and Justice, New York
University School of Law; and Claire Sanders Clements Dean's Professor emeritus,
University of California, Berkeley School of Law; Christine Scott Hayward, a doctoral
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Commissioner for Strategic Planning Michael Farrell and Deputy Inspector Michael Healey
were especially helpful in the enterprise, arranging for interviews with key players,
providing me with statistical information, and wise counsel. I thank Commissioner Kelly for
welcoming me to conduct interviews and make observations of the NYPD.
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2. See DVD: Police in Transition (Hungarian Helsinki Committee 1998) (on file with
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4. See David A. Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 1699 (2005).
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Iraq.
Following the dreadful terrorist attack on New York City's World
Trade Center on September 11, 2001, 5 the New York City Police
Department (NYPD) was required to address three issues beyond its
ordinary anti-crime and law enforcement duties. The first was to prevent
future terrorist attacks; the second was to be capable of instituting
appropriate public health and safety measures in the event of a terrorist
attack; the third was addressing anti-war protest, especially when the
President and his Republican party, were scheduled to hold their
Presidential election convention in New York City in 2004. These
responsibilities: anti-terror prevention; maximizing public health and
safety following an attack; and policing anti-war protest, were
essentially add-ons to the day-to-day and more familiar police public
safety responsibilities of the NYPD.
I.

POLICE WORK

In their day-to-day patrollin§, police are called upon to employ
"non-negotiably coercive force." I shall call this the peacekeeper
paradigm. Most empirical research on police focuses on such
peacekeeping, and stresses styles of street policing. 7 Peacekeepers deal
mainly with minor crimes, the punishment for which is famously "the
process."8 Constitutional law addresses and shapes these practices, but
students of police have shown that they enjoy wide discretion about
whom they stop, search and arrest while peacekeeping. 9 Sometimes,
such discretion is abused, as in "racial profiling." 10
Constitutional law also regulates and shapes police felony
investigative practices-surveillance, searching, taking custody of
persons and property, and questioning-in short, the work of detectives.
Let's call this the detection-prosecution paradigm.
5. See generally Michiko Kakutani, Struggling to Find Words for a Horror Beyond
Words, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2001, at El.
6. EGON BITTNER, THE FUNCTIONS OF POLICE IN MODERN SOCIETY 46 (Oelgeschlager,
Gunn & Hain, Publishers 1980) (1970).
7. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 3, at 13; WILLIAM KER MUIR, JR., POLICE:
STREETCORNER POLITICIANS (1977); JAMES Q. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR
(1968).
8. See, e.g., MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT (1979).
9. See, e.g., Jerome H. Skolnick & Abigail Caplovitz, Guns, Drugs, and Profiling:
Ways to Target Guns and Minimize Racial Profiling, in GUNS, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA 249-79 (Bernard E. Harcourt ed., 2003).
10. See, e.g.' DAYID HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT
WORK (2002); Tom R. Tyler & Cheryl J. Wakslak, Profiling and Police Legitimacy, 42
CRIMINOLOGY 253, 253-81 (2004).

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol33/iss1/14

2

Skolnick: Democratic Policing Confronts Terror An Protest

2005]

Democratic Policing Confronts Terror and Protest
II.

193

CRIME OR TERROR

Anti-terror policing rarely employs coercive force, and is more
concerned with prevention than with criminal prosecution. In currently
fashionable jargon, it is dedicated to the reduction of risk. I I How should
the police and prosecutors respond to a terrorist attack? The response to
the first attack on The World Trade Center on February 26, 1993,
treated it primarily within the detection-prosecution paradigm, even
though the damage to persons and property was breathtaking:
The blast blew through the concourse level of the Vista Hotel two
floors up, as well as three floors down. It tore a three-thousand-pound
diagonal steel brace off the building, sending half of it flying some
thirty-five feet. The gas enhancement apparently failed. Six people,
most of them building workers, were killed while they ate in a
lunchroom, and about a thousand were injured. The damage to the
building cost $510 million to repair. I 2

The perpetrators were alive, and were quickly apprehended by
skilled federal and local detectives. They were tried and convicted in
federal court. Indeed, the rapidity with which the "crime" was solved
eased fears in national and local law enforcement communities about
the danger of a future terrorist attack, and scarcely changed police
organization and practices. I 3
The September 11, 2001 attack on the World Trade Center was
immediately understood as part of a larger strategy-an act of war-to
destroy major American institutions, from business cites to the
Pentagon and the White House. The strategically planned attacks by
suicidal perpetrators revealed the limitations of the "detectionprosecution" paradigm. The nation's response was a declaration of war,
rather than a mobilization of detectives to identify and prosecute
perpetrators.
The 9/11 attacks on New York City and Washington D.C. has
altered police organization and practices in New York City-and
presumably in democratic police departments around the world-for as
11. See, e.g., David Garland, Rise of Risk, in RISK AND MORALITY 48 (Richard V.
Ericson & Aaron Doyle eds., 2003); Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, Actuarial
Justice: the Emerging New Criminal Law, in THE FUTURES OF CRIMINOLOGY 173-201
(David Nelken ed., 1994).
12. DANIEL BENJAMIN & STEVEN SIMON, THE AGE OF SACRED TERROR 12 (2002).
13. NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT
72-73 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT].
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many years as international terrorism remains a threat. In what follows,
I shall describe and discuss some of these changes and their
implications for democratic policing in New York-which naturally has
implications for other cities conducting policing in a democracy during
a time of terror.

Ill.

PROTECTING AGAINST TERROR ATTACKS

Most New Yorkers and most Americans understandably demand a
forceful, energetic effort by federal and local law enforcement to
prevent a major attack against any part of the United States. At the same
time, critics familiar with the abuses of the 1960s linked to J. Edgar
Hoover's F.B.I. and the local "Red Squads," fear that lack of
accountability may lead to new abuses. 14
The USA PATRIOT Act, passed by Congress on October 25,
2001, has been praised by many for providing some of the tools that
will help law enforcement officers to fight modem terrorist activity. 15
Even those who criticize some of the provisions of the Act have
welcomed its emphasis on better coordination among federal, state, and
local agencies, particularly in their intelligence gathering functions. 16
Nevertheless, cautionary critics have attacked the Act for eroding civil
liberties, with provisions giving the FBI access to the personal
information of Americans, such as internet, telephone, education and
library records, without their knowledge and without a specific showing
that they are involved or suspected to be involved in terrorism. 17
14. FRANK DONNER, PROTECTORS OF PRIVILEGE: RED SQUADS AND POLICE REPRESSION
IN URBAN AMERICA 155-96 (1991). This portion of Donner's book entitled "The New York
City Intelligence Unit: The Tarnished Badge of Professionalism," covers the NYPD's
involvement with the Red Squads.
15. See, e.g., Alice Fisher, Fisher/Schulhofer Debate - The USA Patriot Act: Where Do
We Go From Here?, 3 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SEC. 14-16 (2004).
16. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, ASSESSING THE NEW NORMAL: LIBERTY AND SECURITY FOR
THE
POST-SEPTEMBER
11
UNITED
STATES
(2003),
available
at
www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/loss/assesing/assessingnewnormal.htm (last visited Dec.
30, 2005).
17. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act) of 2001, Pub. L. No 107-56,
§§ 215, 505 (2001). USA Patriot Act § 215 amends the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act provisions at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1861-63 to allow the FBI to apply to a magistrate for an
order requiring production of tangible materials, e.g., books, records, papers, documents,
pursuant to an investigation into international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.
FISA orders do not require a showing of probable cause to believe the target is engaged in
criminal activity, rather it requires only a showing that there is probable cause to believe that
the target is the agent of a foreign power. See 50 U.S.C. § 1681. Section 505, which has the
heading Miscellaneous National Security Authorities, amends various provisions throughout
the United States Code, and expands the FBI powers to enlist the efforts of wire or
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Much of the criticism by civil libertarians was directed at Federal
law enforcement, and, especially, U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft.
"One need not fear the reappointment of a J. Edgar Hoover," Stephen
Schulhofer wrote, "to worry that unbridled discretion to build files, ask
embarrassing questions, and spy on dissident political and religious
minorities could harm individuals, stifle First Amendment freedoms,
and waste limited investigative resources that now, more than ever,
need to stay targeted on the most serious potential threats." 18 Even
conservatives, like Congressman Bob Barr, worried about a "wish list"
of authority, requested by federal law enforcement to monitor
communications, financial transactions, and conduct secret searches of
homes and offices. "We must not," he cautioned on September 24,
2001, "stray from the fine balance between freedom and security
created during centuries of court decisions and carefully crafted
legislation." 19 Five years later, the issue has prominently resurfaced, as
the Bush administration resists judicial review over its program of
electronic eavesdropping. 20 Nevertheless, leading Senate Republicans,
including the heads of the Judiciary, Homeland Security and
Intelligence, have said that they prefer some form of judicial
oversight. 21
Prior to 9/11 the NYPD had slight international intelligence
capability-its intelligence activities-especially its undercover
surveillance-was directed mainly against organized crime and major
drug dealing. In the wartime atmosphere following the World Trade
Center bombing, plus two major attacks by terrorists that were not
discovered or prevented by federal intelligence agencies, Commissioner
Raymond V. Kelly recruited international spying and security
specialists to serve as deputy commissioners in the NYPD' s command
staff. 22 Kelly's first choice was David Cohen, a long term senior

electronic communications service providers (18 U.S.C. § 2709), banks (12 U.S.C. § 3414),
and Credit Reporting Agencies (15 U.S.C. § 1618u).
18. STEPHEN SCHULHOFER, THE ENEMY WITHIN: INTELLIGENCE GATHERING, LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THEWAKE OF SEPTEMBER 11, at 61 (2002).
19. BOB BARR, Freedom Versus Security Issues, in IT'S A FREE COUNTRY: PERSONAL
FREEDOM IN AMERICA AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, at 96 (Danny Goldberg et al. eds., 2003).
20. Sheryl Gay Stolberg and David E. Sanger, Facing Pressure, White House Seeks
Approval for Spying, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2006, at A9.
21. Id.
22. See William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L. J. 2137, 2139
(2002). Stuntz surmises that the diversion of resources to anti-terror policing will impair the
capacity of local police to maintain low crime rates, especially in homicide. This was a
reasonable assumption, but it has not been borne out in New York City, where homicide
rates have declined every year since 2001. Id.
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spymaster with the CIA. The 9111 Commission Report notes that Cohen,
in 1996 the head of the CIA' s Directorate of Operations, "organized a
special unit of a dozen officers to analyze intelligence on and plan
operations against Bin Laden. " 23
Michael Sheehan, a former Department of State Ambassador at
Large for Counter Terrorism and later United Nations Assistant
Secretary General in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, is
now the other Deputy Commissioner for Counter Terrorism. Sheehan
was "not diplomatic" in warning the Taliban "that they would be held
responsible for future Al Qaeda attacks" wrote the 9/11 Commission. 24

IV.

COUNTER TERRORISM BUREAU

The intelligence commissioners (Sheehan' s predecessor was Frank
Libuti, a former Marine General, who left to be Deputy Director of
Homeland Security) developed a new Counter Terrorism Bureau, a
Counter-Terrorism Division and a revamped Joint Terrorism Task
Force. Commissioner Kelly assigned more than 1,000 of his best police
(out of about 37,000) to counter terrorism posts throughout the
department. Even more than crime, the reduction of the risk of a terror
attack is the NYPD' s prime concern.
Some of the anti-terror police have overseas assignments. Officers
are stationed in London, working with New Scotland Yard; in Lyon, at
the headquarters of Interpol; and in Tel Aviv, Hamburg, Madrid,
Toronto, and other cities, as well. New York City police have
conducted interrogations in Afghanistan, Egypt, Pakistan, Yemen, the
Philippines, and at the U.S. Army's military prison in Guantanamo Bay.
NYPD detectives were sent to Madrid, to find out whatever they
could learn, following the commuter train bombing in 2004. They had
no official status and were not vetted by the State department. They
were sent in the belief that any information they could gather from
Madrid police to prevent a New York subway or commuter train attack
would be valuable. 25 The subtext, of course, is that the FBI, the CIA
and the Bush administration did not prevent the 9/11 terrorist attack on
New York City-perhaps savvy New York detectives, mentored by
former CIA and counterterrorism specialists like Cohen and Sheehan,
could do better.

23. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 13, at 109.
24. Id. at 176.
25 . Interview with Michael Sheehan, Deputy Comm'r for Counter Terrorism, NYPD,
in New York, N.Y. (Dec. 4, 2002).
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Cohen and Sheehan work closely together and with Kelly, who
they brief five mornings a week at 9 a.m. These meetings, and Cohen
and Sheehan' s presence, are well known throughout the department's
Manhattan headquarters at One Police Plaza, and express the
Department's major commitment to combating terror.
When the Counter Terrorism Bureau was started in 2002, there was
no model or strategy in the NYPD for developing an anti-terrorism
program-despite the 1993 attack and the Giuliani Mayoral years.
Cohen said in a 2002 interview "We have essentially written the book
on a day-in, day-out basis on how to think about the terrorist threat to
the city, what to do about it in warc of prevention, and if, God forbid, we
don't prevent it, how to respond." 6
Al~Qaeda is of course a major focus of counter-terrorism, but said
Cohen "We can't be consumed by Al-Qaeda," adding, "Al Qaeda has
become an umbrella organization that has a very hard core to it, but
there are many other organizations that have essentially signed on to its
agenda. They have overlapping agendas, and therefore are able and
willing to work together. But when their agendas don't match up, they
may go out and do their own thing. " 27
The Counter Terrorism's Bureau's operations center is a long
automobile ride from the fourteen story Manhattan Headquarters of the
NYPD. A police officer and I had trouble locating it among the area's
auto body shops and junkyards, which, at first confusing glance, it
resembles. Yet close up, the roof is dotted with gleaming satellite
antennae. Even the entrance is hard to find. A lone female worker,
standing outside smoking a cigarette, directed us to a plain metal door.
Inside, we found ourselves in a functional building with brightly lit and
painted offices that bear a striking contrast to Manhattan's precinct
houses.
A Global Intelligence room holds large flat screen television sets
tuned into Al-Jazeera and other distant programming. News tickers, like
those in Times Square, display headlines and the latest color alert from
Homeland Security. There are electronic maps and digital readouts from
cities ranging from Moscow to Tel Aviv, from Islamabad to Baghdad,
Beijing, and Tokyo. Communications are monitored by language
specialists who speak many of the languages of the world, including
Arabic, Pashto and Fujianese.

26. Interview with David Cohen, Deputy Comm'r of Intelligence, NYPD, in New
York, N.Y. (Nov. 26, 2002).
27. Id.
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BEYOND HANDSCHU

None of this is legally controversial. Still contentious, however, is
the scope of police investigations of political and religious groups. The
issue has a long history with urban police departments. 28 During the
Vietnam War period, "Red Squad" and COINTEL incursions were
challenged by civil-liberties plaintiffs and their lawyers in major
American cities. In New York City, after long litigation, a highly
respected federal judge, Charles Haight, negotiated a settlement in
1985, known as the "Handschu" agreement. 29 Handschu was one of the
plaintiff activists who in 1971 filed a class action suit accusing the
NYPD of usin~ dossiers and undercover agents to chill and punish
lawful dissent. 3 The settlement actually went into effect in 1985, when
the police promised to follow certain guidelines-especially a core
requirement that police establish some evidence of criminal activity
before undertaking surveillance of an individual. 31
On September 25, 2002, Deputy Commissioner for Intelligence
Cohen asked Judge Haight to make significant modifications to the
agreement. 32 Cohen's request reflected changes in the NYPD's vision of
its post 9/11 anti-terror responsibilities-a concern it shares with local
police departments in democracies throughout the world
In court papers, Commissioner Cohen asserted that "[i]t is difficult
to imagine a state of affairs more outdated by the events of September
11 th." 33 Arguing against the requirement that police must produce
evidence of criminal activity before initiating surveillance, Cohen wrote
that "[t]his criminal requirement as a threshold for investigative
authority may effectively shield from discovery the lawful preparatory
activities which invariably precede terrorist attacks. In the case of
terrorism, to wait for an indication of crime before investigating is to
wait far too long." 34
The lawyers opposing the city acknowledged the tragedy of
September 11, but denied that it presented a persuasive reason to allow
police to record names from organizations mailing lists and petitions, to

28. See DONNER, supra note 14.
29. See Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 605 F. Supp. 1384, 1389-93, 1420-24
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (Handschu I).
30. See id. at 1388.
31. See id. at 1389.
32. See Handschu v. Special Servs. Div. 273 F. Supp. 2d 327, 329 (S.D.N.Y 2003)
(Handschu II).
33. Id. at 341.
34. Id. at 339.
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photograph and videotape protestors, and to plant undercover agents
inside groups and events. 35 Recalling those days, they believed that that
the police would overstep the bounds of civil liberty in monitoring
protests and infiltrating organizations. 36 They argued that the guidelines
come into play only when the NYPD intends to investigate persons or
groups who associate or express themselves to support or criticize
government policies or social conditions. 37 Terrorists, they claimed,
don't do that; nor do members of covert cells exercise rights of
advocacy and free expression. 38
Judge Haight acknowledged that some of Commissioner Cohen's
claims might be overbroad. 39 After all, he pointed out, renting
apartments, leasing cars or taking flying lessons, as the 9/11 terrorists
did, is not participation in political activities. 4 Consequently, the police
were not constrained from investigation of such activities. But he
rejected the civil libertarians' implicit assumption that terrorists would
never engage in "lawful political, religious, educational or social
activities" to further their unlawful purposes. 41 "[T]he convicted
architect of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing was the imam of a
mosque. . . . [A] sad reality," he comments, ". . . but a reality
nonetheless. "42
It is in the light of such realities that Commissioner Cohen argued
that "the use of undercovers is a necessary and vital tool."43 He did not
say explicitly that he is planning to place undercover operatives in
Islamic religious, social, political or educational institutions.
Nevertheless, given the radical Islamist creed of the terrorists who have
attacked the United States at home and abroad, and that the architect of
the 1993 bombing was the imam of a Brooklyn mosque, the inference
seems inescapable that undercover officers or agents will likely be sent
into mosques.
Given the post 9/11 dangers facing the city, on February 11, 2003,
Judge Haight granted the city's motion to modify the Handschu
agreement, with terror, rather than crime, being the lynchpin of
permissible police inquiry. In addition, the NYPD is permitted to share

°

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

See id. at 338-39.
See id.
See Handschu, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 338-39.
See id.
Id. at 339.
Id.
Id.
Handschu, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 339.
Id.
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information with federal, state and local law enforcement agencies
which were formerly required to comply with Handschu' s restrictions
before they could review the NYPD' s intelligence data. 44
The first paragraph of the new "Guidelines For Investigations of
Political Activity," crafted following Judge Haight's decision, contains
the following language:
Subsequent to the terrorist attacks on the City of New York on
September 11, 2001, which resulted in the loss of thousands of lives
and the total destruction of the World Trade Center complex, it
became apparent that the City faces unprecedented threats to its
continued safety and security. In the view of federal, state and local
law enforcement agencies, the prevention of future attacks requires the
development of intelligence and the investigation of potential terrorist
activity before an unlawful act occurs. 45

VI. THE RISK RESPONSE

Security against terrorist attack has become the NYPD's major
focus and major anxiety, even more than crime control, which the
NYPD has confidently dealt with for a decade or more. (It is interesting
to note that the 2,800 deaths on September 11, 2001, are not counted as
homicides in the NYPD' s crime statistics. Murders committed by
terrorists are categorized in a class by themselves.) Commissioner
Kelly and Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg have regularly lobbied
Congress for more anti-terrorist funds for New York City, repeating an
undeniable claim-that the city has taken the hit for the nation, and that
federal law enforcement did not prevent terrorists from twice attacking
the World Trade Center.
Were we to convert democratic values into the language of risk, 46
we could conclude that the greater the risk of a terrorist attack, the more
likely are legislators and judges to offer deference to local and federal
police to collect information, search premises and "seize" persons and
their possessions. The attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon, as well as other attacks internationally, have clearly altered
the normative terrain of how the rule of law in the United States strikes
the balance between security and liberty.

44. See id. at 341, 349-50.
45. NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, Preamble to Guidelines for Investigations of
Political Activity, in NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT PATROL GUIDE MANUAL (2004).
46. See Garland, supra note 11, at 48.
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Mostly, the public appreciates and supports heightened security
measures. Few, if any, citizens object to visible target hardening,
despite the inconvenience of searches in entering public buildings or
airports. Ironically, target hardening, particularly in securing valuable
buildings, was already far advanced before the 9/11 attack.
Indeed, because the World Trade Center buildings had been
bombed in 1993, those buildings were protected by state-of-the-art
security-which obviously did not include protection from terrorists
who turned hijacked airplanes into massive weapons of destruction.
Since that attack, airline passengers have learned to accept not only
clearance by a metal detector, but even more intrusive searches. As a
society, we have reached a new normative consensus allowing security
measures once considered to be privacy invasions as "normal."
VII. TRAINING FOR TERROR-THE LOCAL BECOMES INTERNATIONAL47
Training for terrorist attacks presents a novel and difficult
challenge for urban police. The post-9/11 Training Division, headed by
Deputy Commissioner James J. Fyfe, has two responsibilities related to
terrorism: training patrol officers to prevent terrorism and training them
to respond to a terrorist attack. In addition, police are encouraged to
broaden their knowledge. Terrorism is international, and what happens
in Tel Aviv, Madrid, or London-and the security shortcomings in
those cities-is highly relevant to the safety of New York City.
Consequently, New York City police are encouraged to read and learn
as much as they can about how terrorists operate abroad, through
newspapers, books, television and the internet.
Patrol officers-"peacekeepers"-have always been taught to
gather information in the neighborhoods where they work. This
requires developing a conception of normal and acceptable behavior.
One can appreciate that something is out of order only if he or she
develops a conception of the normal order. Usually, Commissioner
Fyfe pointed out, police officers' observations focus on geographically
confined locations, violations of the penal code, and short time frames.
Police have always gathered generalized information about criminal
conduct. Indeed, part of the rationale for community and problemoriented policing is based on expanding neighborhood knowledge-but
usually regarding more common crimes, such as unlawful drug dealing.
47. The following is taken from a series of interviews conducted over the course of
2004 with James J. Fyfe, Deputy Comm'r for Training, NYPD, in New York, N.Y. James J.
Fyfe passed away from cancer on November 12, 2005, see Al Baker, James Fyfe, 63,
Criminologist and Police Training Director, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2005, at A25.
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Post-9/11, NYPD recruits and officers are encouraged to make
contact with doormen, building superintendents, janitors, anyone who
might be in a position to see something unusual, suggestive, but not
necessarily illegal. "We know that terrorists don't like to live in comers,
they prefer the middle of the block, they keep windows covered, they
have little furniture, they come and go, they pay in cash, they don't have
checking accounts, [and] they don't have credit cards. Any one of these
is not a crime, but taken together, they might constitute a pattern
suggesting terrorist activities," said Fyfe. "So if a cop can build
relationships in a community, that's valuable for enforcing the criminal
law, and for preventing terror."
Prevention is not difficult to teach to police, since it involves
redirecting them in some already familiar paths. Responding to a
terrorist attack is more difficult. "Police officers typically work by
themselves or with a partner, and respond to crises as they come up,"
Fyfe explained. "But if there is a major terrorist event, police officers
will be required to work as part of a coordinated machine, so we train
officers to know their specific duties, and where he or she fits into the
whole operation."
This involves training officers in large cohorts-which clearly
necessitates overtime-and for this the Department has received
additional funding as a result of one of Commissioner Kelly's many
fund-seeking trips to the nation's capital.
Approximately ten thousand officers have been trained to respond
to what the NYPD calls COBRA events-chemical or biological and
radiological attacks. Officers are trained with their own work groups,
including a Lieutenant, Sergeant and eight or ten officers. They are
trained alongside a comparable group or two from the same patrol
borough so they can coordinate and will have practiced their assignment
if an event happens.
The Chief of Department and the Counter-Terrorism Division
undertake mobilization training exercises five or six times a day, in
different parts of the city, but mainly in Manhattan. From time to time
one can see in Manhattan a cluster of police officers, who have been
randomly called together, as in a fire alarm test. Sometimes police will
be drawn from different boroughs so that officers, who work in northern
Queens, for example, or south Brooklyn, will know parts of the city,
especially Manhattan, most likely to be attacked by terrorists.
All NYPD officers are now carrying, as part of their uniform,
hoods that will allow them to breathe for about half an hour in case of a
chemical or biological attack. "We also," Fyfe said, "train officers to
wear complete body suits. These are not protective enough for the
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol33/iss1/14
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officers who are assigned to dispose of weapons of mass destruction,
but they are protective of those who need to function in that
environment. Our training officers, who have been trained by federal
specialists in Alabama, are currently training 10,000 of our officers to
function in that environment." These officers were trained and
available for duty at the 2004 Republican National Convention.
The threat of terror has heightened cooperation among the tangle
of police agencies responsible for the safety of major local
transportation hubs. Should a terrorist event have occurred in
Manhattan's Pennsylvania Station during the Republican National
Convention a number of agencies were prepared to coordinate. These
agencies included New York City police and firefighters, New York's
Emergency Management Office, the Port Authority and Transit
Authority, and Emergency Medical Services. Federal police, the FBI,
ATF and Secret Service would probably be on the scene, as well. If the
attack was on a train that passed through New Jersey those responding
might include Amtrak police and local and state New Jersey police. We
still, of course, have local police patrolling in neighborhoods, but
policing in the major Metropolitan areas-especially when terror
threatens-often crosses local boundaries.
Because American police are local and not national, each agency
has typically developed its own "Incident Command System," with
distinctive terminology and "protocols," that can be like a different
language for other departments. The National Homeland Security
agency has mandated that all U.S. law enforcement agencies follow a
standardized Incident Command System. But this also involves a
substantial retraining task for a department the size of the NYPD.
Unlike crime, which is the familiar, inevitable, and measurable part
of the police assignment, there are no measures of success against
terrorism except the absence of attack. As I write this in early 2006,
following the Republican National Convention, no subways, buses or
major buildings have exploded in New York City, nor has the city been
threatened with chemical or biological weapons. But New York is the
city that, as Kelly often reminds questioners, twice "took the hit for the
nation." When a possible threat to bomb the New York City subway
arose in October 2005, city officials took it very seriously, even though
it was somewhat discounted by the Homeland Security Agency, but not
by the FBI. 48 Since 9/11, the NYPD takes every credible threat
seriously, even if unproven. Vigilance is the NYPD's watchword-it is
48. Willam K. Rashbaum & Douglas Jehl, Terror Officials Work to Assess Subway

Threat, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2005, at Al.
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always on "orange" or heightened alert.
VIII. PROTEST

If police investigation involving political and religious activity is
inevitably a delicate "democratic rule of law" issue in "wartime," so is
public protest. Two major anti-Iraq War protests occurred in New York
City, one controversial and heavily criticized by the New York Civil
Liberties Union; the other less so. The first, on February 15, 2003,
coincided with a day of worldwide demonstrations against the U.S.
invasion of Iraq. The city insisted on a "stationary rally" instead of a
march, with the police using "pens" to control crowd movement. This
crowd control tactic worked well on New Year's Eve celebrations in
Times Square, where the NYPD mounted a show of force to prevent a
terrorist attack on the New Year celebrations of 2002-2004, and where
crowds cooperate in celebration. But it did not work so well in an antiwar protest rally.
The NYPD changed and improved its tactics in a March 22, 2003
demonstration. Nevertheless, several hundred protesters who were
arrested were debriefed about their political activities; where they had
attended school, what organizations they belonged to, and their
involvement with past protests. 49 Constitutional scholars and civil
libertarians considered the practice a violation of civil liberty, which
could have a chilling effect on political freedom and brought the matter
to federal district court.
Commissioner Kelly and Deputy
Commissioner Cohen apologized, telling the Court that they were
unaware of the practice; that it would be discontinued, and the collected
data destroyed. 50

IX.

THE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION -

2004

New York City authorities, especially the police, planned for
eighteen months for the challenges likely to occur in connection with
the Republican National Convention (August 29 to September 3, 2004).
Preparation involved all levels of the Department, but especially the
training division, counterterrorism units, and special disorder control
units. High ranking officials reviewed the websites of potentially
disruptive protestors.
To illustrate negative examples of police conduct, thousands of

49. See Benjamin Weiser, Judge Criticizes Police Methods of Questioning Protestors,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2003, at Bl.
50. See id.
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officers were shown videotapes of disorderly protests, where police
clashed with protestors. Officers were shown how protestors might
taunt them, they were taught how to avoid conflict, how to remain calm
and in command of themselves and to appreciate that televised images
of cops beating protestors was a goal of the anarchist protestors. The
police were taught not to respond individually. They were instructed to
use force only as a unit, on orders from a supervisor, not on their own
initiative. 51
The Republican National Convention was also considered to be a
dangerous time for a terrorist event, in line with Al-Qaeda's previous
Moreover, a Republican
history of attacking symbolic targets.
Convention in New York City was certain to attract delegates, tourists,
and protestors in huge numbers. Based on previous anti-free trade and
anti-war protests, police managers assumed that some protestors would
try to be disruptive. For example, the RNCNotWelcome website's
"Direct Action Handbook" offered instructions in tactics that were
arguably unlawful-for example, wearing masks while protesting. 52
Described in The New York Times as "one of the greatest tests
Police Department has seen in recent rears," the Republican
Convention was indeed a major challenge. 5 The NYPD needed to
respond to days of protest, in different locations, as well as be prepared
for a potential terrorist attack, all the while being watched,
photographed and televised by an international body of journalists.
Some of the protest highlights were as follows:
On Thursday, August 26, eleven Act Up members stood naked on
Eighth Avenue and 34th Street (opposite Madison Square Garden), and
blocked traffic to protest what they claimed was the under financing of
AIDS programs by the Bush Administration. They were arrested. 54
On Friday, August 27, thousands of Critical Mass cyclists rode
from Union Square to Central Park to the West Side and back to the
East Village. More than 100 were arrested, most for disorderly
conduct. 55

51. Videotape: Crowd Control and Protest Training Video (New York City Police
Department 2003) (on file with the New York Police Department).
52. Direct Action Handbook, http://www.mcnotwelcome.org/daction.html (last visited
Dec. 30, 2005).
53. See Michael Slackman & Al Baker, The Republicans: The Convention in New
York-The Police; With Restraint and New Tactics, March Is Kept Ordely, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 30, 2004, at Pl.
54. See Diane Cardwell, Preparing for the Convention: Demonstrations; For
Convention, Demonstrations Start Early, as Do Arrests, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2004, at Bl.
55. See Randal C. Archibold, Preparing for the Convention: Protesters; 100 Cyclists
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On Saturday, August 28, an estimated 25,000 persons, mostly
women, marched across the Brooklyn Bridge to City Hall to demand
access to safe abortion, "real sex education," birth control options and
family planning. 56
The largest march, with as many as 300,000 protestors-not all
from start to finish-took place almost without incident on Sunday,
August 29, 2004. Most of a few hundred arrests were videotaped by
police officers, and also by camera carrying monitors, offering pictorial
evidence to test any later claims of police misconduct.
There was general agreement, even by those normally critical of
the police, that the main march occurred virtually without incident.
Civil rights lawyer and radio talk show host Ronald Kuby agreed, but
credited the protestors for the peacefulness of the march saying that "A
quarter of a million people made a commitment to a peaceful[,] legal
march.... They were the ones who kept the peace .... So this notion
that the police did a good job is true only to the extent that the
demonstrators themselves had a }?owerful commitment to keep this
demonstration peaceful and legal." 7
Nevertheless, a team of seven observers assigned by The New
York Times reported that as hundreds of thousands demonstrators
marched and sometimes confronted the police, the police avoided
confrontation, as they had been trained to do-even with anarchist
protestors who would engage with in-the-face confrontation. "At one
point, a large group of demonstrators surrounded a patrol car, waving
anarchist flags and taunting the two officers inside. The police officers
hit their siren, backed up and drove off. A few uniformed officers
arrived and ordered the protestors onto the sidewalks, and the group just
melted away. "58 According to reporters covering the main march,
protestors praised the police for their overall restraint, noting, in
particular, that individual officers did not allow themselves to be
provoked.
In a post-RNC press conference on Friday, September 3,
Commissioner Kelly praised his officers and the vast majority of
protestors for mostly peaceful and lawful protest. 59 He announced that
Are Arrested as Thousands Ride in Protest, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2004, at B 1.
56. See Michael Slackman & Ann Farmer, Campaign 2004: Demonstrations; 25,000
Abortion-Rights Advocates March to City Hall, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2004, at A27.
57. Slackman & Baker, supra note 53.
58. See id.
59. See Randal C. Archibold & Michael Wilson, After The Convention:
Demonstrations; Police and Protesters Spar A Last Time, Over the Peace, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 4, 2004, at B 1.
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arrests for convention-related incidents totaled 1,821.60 Of these, fiftysix were for felonies, 282 were misdemeanors, 1,480 were for
violations, and three arrests were of juveniles. 61
Anarchists told reporters that they had not planned to §enerate
violence on the scale of the Miami and Seattle protests. 6 "John
Flanigan, an anarchist organizer in New York, [said] no such violence
was necessary at the convention because 'so much attention is already
on it. "'63 Instead, they said that they focused on blocking traffic, directly
harassing and taunting Republican delegates at their hotels and events,
and engaging in acts of civil disobedience. 64
But the NYPD had learned much from studying the earlier Miami
and Seattle protests. The police created a "buffer zone" by employing
two barriers in order to discourage confrontation between the protestors
and the police. 65 Occasionally, anarchist protestors were able to goad
the police into shutting traffic down briefly, and engaging in acts of
civil disobedience, but the police were able to clear up such roadblocks
quickly. 66
The Department also employed a combination of strategic and
tactical intelligence. Protestors' websites were scrutinized to know
where to position mobile units on Vespa-like scooters, bicycles,
motorcycles and vans. 67 The NYPD monitored from the skies, with a
blimp and helicopters reporting events on the ground. 68 On December
22, 2005, Jim Dwyer of the New York Times reported that a police
helicopter recorded "an intimate moment" of a lovemaking couple on a
dark rooftop-illustrating how it is possible for legitimate surveillance
to wrongfully invade privacy. 69
In many locations, the police used orange colored nets to scoop up
potential crowds before they had a chance to block roadways. 70 Almost
inevitably, at some locations, ordinary pedestrians were caught up in the
netting. This generated some resentment among non-protesting New

60. Id.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See Robert Kolker, Law Pre-Enforcement, N.Y. MAGAZINE, Sept. 20, 2004, at 20.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. Jim Dwyer, Police Video Caught a Couple's Intimate Moment on a Manhattan
Rooftop, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2005, at BIO.
70. See id.
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Yorkers, who vote Democratic and oppose President Bush's decision to
invade Iraq.
Nevertheless, unlike the police actions in Miami or Seattle, the
NYPD officers never struck with batons: no matter how close or nasty
the taunts of some of the protestors. "Speed and the presence of a small
number of officers early on are more important than having a large
number of officers later," Kelly told a New York Magazine reporter in
explaining the success of the police tactics. 71 "We had done research of
other cities, and the protestors would go against the flow of traffic or
take the subway and pop up in some location unannounced. The
mobility enabled us to react very quickly to that. The protestors, they
even said that-they were unpleasantly surprised." 72
Although there were few accusations of excessive force, protestors
and civil liberties lawyers accused the police of making more arrests
than were legally justified, and of keeping hundreds of activists locked
up for longer than was necessary--or legal-until the convention
ended. 73 Those who were arrested-mainly for "violations," like a ticket
for overtime parking, a charge less than misdemeanor-also complained
about being fingerprinted, about the unsanitary conditions of
confinement, as well as the food. 74
Although city officials said that those arrested were being
processed as quickly as possible-and that the conditions and the food
were acceptable, the protestors and their lawyers complained that the
City violated a "twenty-four hour rule" requiring the city to arraign
defendants within twenty-four hours of their arrest. 75 A state court judge
agreed, holding the City in contempt, and fining the City $1000 for each
arrestee held beyond the twenty-four hours. 76 Lawyers for those who
had been arrested promised that lawsuits would follow, while City
officials denied any wrongdoing. 77 In the end, the NYPD settled with

71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See Jim Dwyer, City Arrest Tactics, Used on Protestors, Face Test in Court, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 17' 2004, at A 1.
74. See id.
75. See Jim Dwyer, Judge May Consider Inquiry Into Detention of Protestors, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 20, 2005, at B3.
76. See Daniel Wise, Delay in Processing Protestors Leads to Finding of Contempt,
231 N.Y.L.J. 1, Sept. 3, 2004.
77. For the NYPD's Statement see STATEMENT OF DEPUTY CHIEF JOHN COLGAN,
EXECUTIVE OFFICE, COUNTER-TERRORISM BUREAU, NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT
TO GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS COMMITTEE OF THE NEW YORK CITY COUNCIL (Oct. 26,
2004), http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/dcpi/mctestimony.html (last visited Dec. 30,
2005).
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protestors on the processing delay claims paying $150 to 108 protestors
and $215,000 in attorneys' fees.78 As we saw, the policing of protest
poses a major challenge for democratic policing. The First Amendment
protects "the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances,"79 but it does not protect
those whose goal is to provoke the police into streetfighting.80
In response, the police inserted undercover officers into some of
the demonstrations, notably those of the Critical Mass cyclists,
thousands of whom "flooded the streets on the Friday before the
Republican National Convention."81 The NYPD defended the tactic,
saying that their goal was not to investigate politics, but to protect
orderly free expression. 82 The problem, of course, is that police
infiltrators, to establish their bona fl.des, may encourage the very
disorder that their infiltration is intended to prevent.
CONCLUSION

Policing in a time of terror raises issues for democratic "rule of
law" policing that are only beginning to emerge. Terrorist attacks have
demanded that police develop strategies that were not dreamt of nearly
half a century ago when researchers began to study police. Yet we see
that the same basic question-what we mean by policing under the rule
of law-is ever more relevant.
Under the rule of law, police, who are part of the executive branch
of government, may not behave arbitrarily, and must be accountable to
an independent judiciary. It does not mean, however, that the judiciary
will necessarily overrule the police. Since the 1970s, the judiciary has
become increasingly deferential to police practices, and especially so
following the 9111 terrorist attacks. Legislation offering greater
investigative latitude to the Federal police, such as the Patriot Act, has
largely been upheld by the courts. 83
Especially after a terrorist attack, the judiciary is likely to defer to

78. See Daniel Wise, Under Cardozo, Law Department Strives for Big-Firm Image,
N.Y.L.J., Aug. 15, 2005, at 1.
79. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
80. Crimethinc.com, Demonstrating Resistance: Mass Action and Autonomous Action
in the Election Year, http://www.crimethinc.com/features/10.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2005).
81. Jim Dwyer, New York Police Covertly Join in at Protest Rallies, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
22, 2005, at Al.
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 729-30 (Foreign Int'l Surveillance Ct.
Rev. 2002). See also John T. Soma et al. , Balance of Privacy vs. Security: A Historical
Perspective of the USA PATRIOT Act, 31 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 285 (2005).
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the security claims of police-up to a point. We saw that drama played
out in New York when a Federal judge, who had formerly constrained
the police, upheld the request of the Deputy Commissioner for
Intelligence to investigate persons and infiltrate political organizations,
regardless of whether the police can show a connection to criminal
activity-which they formerly had to do.
To enhance democratic policing, it is essential to have a vibrant
and effective civil liberties bar, with legal adversariness understood as a
necessary, even if often annoying to police, aspect of the rule of law.
Although the New York Civil Liberties Union lost in the Handschu
case, which gave greater latitude to the NYPD's intelligence division,
the civil libertarians won when a judge fined the city $1,000 for each
arrested protestor held in confinement beyond twenty-four hours.
Approximately 550 people were quickly released. 84
Democratic police must respect the right of dissent and protest, as
the NYPD did during the Republican National Convention. By no
means did the city authorities grant the protestors all of their requests.
But with their lawyers, the protestors could appeal to the courts for
relief; and win some, lose some.
We could imagine that, following two terrorist attacks,
undemocratic authorities might declare martial law. Citizens would be
forbidden to protest in the hundreds of thousands against a war and
against the party in power. Yet protest against a wartime President and
the ruling Republican Party, even with the presence of Intemetadvertised, and previously-violent anarchist protestors, was accepted by
the NYPD and the federal authorities as a problem to be handled by
training and preparation, not by anything remotely resembling martial
law.
In a democracy, police actions need to be open and visible to the
public and a free press, as they have been in New York City during
protest demonstrations. In particular, thousands of cameras recorded
the protests against the Republican National Convention. A free and
active press is a necessary condition for democratic policing, in ordinary
times as a bulwark against police corruption and excessive force; and
especially during wartime, when police stopping-and-searching
activities are likely to be more aggressive. 85

84. Jennifer Gonnerman, The Waiting Game, VILLAGE VOICE, Sept. 7, 2004, available
at http://www.villagevoice.com/news/0436,gonnerman,56544,1.html (last visited Dec. 30,
2005).
85. See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
FOUND. REs. J. 521. Blasi has argued thatthe Founder's conception of freedom of the press
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In democratic and multicultural societies, police discrimination
against members of minority groups is an ever present issue. Will
police in Iraq treat members of other religious and ethnic backgrounds
evenhandedly? Do police in London, Paris, Madrid-or New York?
In New York City, the Kelly administration has had its share of
critics, especially complaining about the numbers of minority officers in
positions of authority. At the same time, most major U.S. police
departments have been fairly successful at integrating minorities and
women-more successful than have most university faculties. 86 This is
not to suggest that minorities do not complain-and file lawsuitsabout police practices. 87 But in cities with large minority populations,
police departments increasingly take these complaints seriously, and
several are under federal court order to revise practices.
Racially appropriate policing requires an active civil rights bar to
investigate and challenge police misconduct. Every government entity
and its police should be accountable for the criminal and civil wrongs of
its officers.
Democratic policing under the rule of law is an abstract ideal, an
aspiration that will vary in different venues around the world. The key
to democratic policing is of course, and everywhere, accountability to
the rule of law. But, as we have seen in New York City-and in other
American police departments-to be more than a slogan, policing
according to the rule of law depends on the vitality of ancillary
institutions-an able judiciary, a civil liberties and civil rights bar, free
and honest elections, and a free press.
There is no perfect model, but the post 9/11 NYPD is a good
example of democratic policing in a time of terror. Since the city has
twice been victimized by terrorist attacks, the NYPD has reorganized
itself to prevent such attacks. It has aggressively sought, through the
courts, greater authority to conduct investigations even when it lacks
evidence of criminal activity.
At the same time, New York is a city rich with institutions of
accountability, including elections, courts, a vibrant civil liberties and
civil rights bar and a free press. Its Mayor and Police Commissioner
rested on the "the value that free speech, a free press, and free assembly can serve in
checking the abuse of power of public officials." Id. at 544. For an elaboration on this
theory as applied to the institution of the police, see Jerome H. Skolnick and Candace
McCoy, Police Accountability and the Media, 1984 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521.
86. See Jennifer Lee, In Police Class, Blue Comes in Many Colors, N.Y. TIMES, July 8,
2005, at Bl.
87. See Deborah Livingston, Police Reform and the Department of Justice: An Essay
on Accountability, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 815 (1999).
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believe in the rule of law, and are responsive to public opinion. They do
not reflexively support their police. With its reorganization post-9/11 to
combat terror, with improvements in recruitment, training and tactics,
with its handling of the Republican National Convention, and the city's
low crime rates, the New York City Police Department has become
something of a model for democratic policing in the U.S. and even
around the western world.
This in an international city, a majority of whose residents are nonwhite, and speak most of the world's languages. In the latest NYPD
recruit class of 1,600, nearly fifty percent of the graduates are nonwhite.
And many of the white recruits are themselves immigrants, (but not
Irish or Italian) and live in the city, unlike the older white officers who
gravitated to the suburbs.88
That the NYPD should emerge after 9/11 as something of a model
of democratic policing is an outcome that, following the periodic
corruption and brutality scandals that plagued the NYPD for the largest
part of the twentieth century, plus the fears aroused by the direct
terrorist hit on the city on September 11, 2001, would scarcely have
been predicted.

88. See Lee, supra note 86.
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